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SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION ACT-SUPREME COURT
UNDERMINES CONGRESS'S EFFORT
TO CRACK DowN ON SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRATION
Andrew Gillman*
N Carr v. United States, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split by
incorrectly holding that liability under § 2250 of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) cannot be predicated on
interstate travel that occurred before the passage of the statute.' Section
2250 of SORNA makes it a criminal offense with a maximum prison sen-
tence of ten years when anyone who is required to register under
SORNA, "travels in interstate or foreign commerce... and knowingly fails
to register or update [their] registration as required by the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act."'2 The Court's overly simplistic textual
analysis of this statute, which emphasizes the verb tense of "to travel"
and the sequential elements of SORNA, glosses over the anomalous pol-
icy implications that have resulted from the Court's refusal to extend
§ 2250 to sex offenders who engaged in pre-SORNA travel.
In 2004, Thomas Carr (Carr) pled guilty to sexual abuse in Alabama
state court. 3 Following his release from prison, he registered as a sex of-
fender under Alabama state law.4 Shortly after his registration and prior
to SORNA's enactment, Carr moved from Alabama to Indiana.5 Cart
failed to register pursuant to Indiana's registration requirements, which
carries a prison sentence of up to three years.6 Federal officials eventu-
ally discovered Carr as a result of his involvement in a fight, and he was
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1. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2233 (2010). The Court declined to consider
whether the alternative interpretation of the statute would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the Constitution. Id. Accordingly, an analysis of ex post facto implications falls outside
the scope of this Note.
2. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006) (empha-
sis added).





charged in the Northern District of Indiana for failing to register under
§ 2250 of SORNA. 7
Carr moved to dismiss, arguing that his interstate travel occurred prior
to SORNA's effective date and thus would violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution.8 Carr entered a conditional guilty plea after
the court denied his motion and was sentenced to thirty months in
prison. 9 The Seventh Circuit consolidated Carr's appeal with that of an-
other defendant who also asserted that § 2250 of SORNA does not apply
to sex offenders who travelled prior to the statute's effective date.10
The Seventh Circuit created a split with the Tenth Circuit by holding
that the scope of § 2250 extends to defendants who engaged in interstate
travel prior to the statute's effective date. 1 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits as to the proper scope
of the travel requirement under SORNA. 12
In holding that § 2250 does not extend to pre-SORNA travel, the Su-
preme Court relies exclusively on two textual arguments: (1) the verb
tense that Congress incorporated in § 2250 is the present tense and thus
refers to present and future travel, and (2) the elements of the statute
must occur in sequential order.13 The Court also attacks the Seventh Cir-
cuit's two principal arguments for construing the statute to cover pre-
SORNA travel: (1) to "avoid[ ] an anomaly in the statute's coverage of
federal versus state sex offenders" and (2) to "better effectuate[ I the stat-
utory purpose. '14
The Court relies on the Dictionary Act to attach significance to the
verb tense of the travel requirement in § 2250.15 The Dictionary Act
states that "words used in the present tense include the future as well as
the present."'16 Accordingly, the Court concludes that "by implication,"
the Dictionary Act directs that "the present tense... does not include the
past." 17 While the Dictionary Act allows for an exception to this princi-
ple when the "context indicates otherwise," the Court remains convinced
that the context supports a forward-looking construction of the travel re-
quirement.' The Court supports their contention by pointing to other
present tense verbs in the statute and relying on Gwaltney of Smithfield,





11. Compare United States v. Carr, 551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd 130 S. Ct.
2229 (2010) (holding that § 2250 applies to pre-SORNA travel), with United States v.
Husted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that § 2250 does not apply to pre-
SORNA travel).
12. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2234.
13. Id. at 2235-37.
14. Id. at 2238 (internal quotations omitted).
15. Id. at 2236.
16. Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
17. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2236.
18. 1 U.S.C. § 1; see Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2237.
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deviating use of the present tense" may serve as support for a prospective
interpretation of the statute.19 The Court dismisses the dissent's observa-
tion that other SORNA provisions "plainly use the present tense to refer
to events that... may have occurred before SORNA took effect." °20 The
Court attributes this discrepancy to differences in the definitional and en-
forcement sections of statutes. 21 In arguing that the elements of § 2250
should be read "sequentially," the Court asserts that the first element of
the statute is the registration requirement under SORNA rather than the
sex offense conviction. 22 Since a sex offender may only become subject
to the registration requirements after the statute's effective date, the
Court contends that a convicted sex offender must both engage in inter-
state travel and then fail to register after the statute's effective date to be
liable under SORNA.23 By contrast, the dissent maintains that the first
act necessary to trigger the registration requirement under SORNA is the
sex offense conviction. 24 The majority dismisses this suggestion outright
as inconsistent with the statutory text with little explanation or support.2 5
Following the Court's grammar lesson in verb tense, the Court re-
sponds to the Seventh Circuit's arguments. First, the Court disputes the
Seventh Circuit's contention that § 2250(a)(2) should apply equally to
federal and state sex offenders. 26 The Court insists that Congress could
have "subject[ed] any unregistered state sex offender who has ever trav-
eled in interstate commerce to federal prosecution" if they had wanted to
and suggests that it is perfectly reasonable for Congress to have given
states primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with sex-offender
registration statutes. 27 The Court also distinguishes § 2250 of SORNA
from the federal felon-in-possession statute that the Seventh Circuit anal-
ogizes. 28 In particular, the Court argues that the interstate travel compo-
nent of the statute is the actual conduct that the government sought to
punish rather than the jurisdictional element of the offense. 29
19. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2237; Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (noting that suit may be brought for a violation that is "in
effect" and that plaintiffs must give notice of the alleged violation).
20. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2237 n.6.
21. Id. (noting that the "definitional section ... elucidates the meaning of certain
statutory terms and proscribes no conduct").
22. Id. at 2235-36.
23. Id. at 2237.
24. Id. at 2248 (Alito, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2236 n.4 (majority opinion).
26. Id. at 2238-40.
27. Id. at 2238-39.
28. Id. at 2239. The Seventh Circuit recognized that other courts had interpreted
§ 922, the federal felon-in-possession statute, to reach felons who traveled interstate before
the statute's effective date. United States v. Carr, 551 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd
130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). Given the similarities between the two statutes, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that § 2250 of SORNA also extends to sex offenders who travelled interstate
prior to the statute's effective date. Id. at 583.
29. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2239; see Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (2006)
(prohibiting convicted felons from "possess[ing] in or affecting commerce any firearm or
ammunition"). The majority relies on Scarborough to assert that the danger lies with the
possession of the firearm rather than movement across state lines.
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Alternatively, the Court disputes the Seventh Circuit's assertion that
an interpretation of the statute that reaches pre-SORNA travel better
effectuates the statute's purpose. 30 Although Congress enacted SORNA
with the backdrop of over 100,000 sex offenders or nearly one-fifth of the
nation's sex offenders "missing," the Court maintains that the general
goal of SORNA and purpose of § 2250 do not necessarily align and that
§ 2250 is not a singular response to the problem of missing sex
offenders.3 1
In dissent, Justice Alito responds that "the Court's textual arguments
are thoroughly unsound" and engages in a practical analysis that focuses
on the purpose of the statute and the odd predicament that results from
the majority's interpretation. 32 Justice Alito asserts that, in accordance
with "widely accepted modern legislative drafting convention[s]," all stat-
utes should be written in the present tense to "speak[ ] as of whatever
time it is being read (rather than as of when drafted, enacted, or put into
effect)," thus undermining the majority's present tense argument.33 Ac-
cordingly, the statute should speak "as of the time when the first act nec-
essary for conviction is committed," which is the initial sex offense. 34
Furthermore, "SORNA was a response to a dangerous gap" in sex of-
fender registration laws that was meant to uncover "missing" sex offend-
ers in the United States. 35 The dissent concludes that the application of
SORNA to sex offenders traveling before the statute's effective date
would better accomplish that statutory goal.
36
The Supreme Court's decision in Carr relies excessively on their
mechanical analysis of SORNA while glossing over the policy implica-
tions that result from such an interpretation. As the majority concedes,
SORNA was enacted to fill a "dangerous gap" in sex offender registra-
30. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2240-42. The Seventh Circuit recognized that "[t]he evil at
which [the Act] is aimed is that convicted sex offenders registered in one state might move
to another state, fail to register there, and thus leave the public unprotected." Carr, 551
F.3d at 582 (citing H.R. REP. No. 109-218, at 23-24, 26 (2005)).
31. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2240-41; 152 Cong. Rec. H5705 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (state-
ment of Rep. Sensenbrenner). The Court identifies "missing" sex offenders as those that
"have not complied with sex offender registration requirements." Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2240.
The Court recognizes that this typically happens when a sex offender moves from one
state to another. Id.
32. Id. at 2243 (Alito, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 2244-45 (citing House Legislative Counsel's Manual on Drafting Style, HLC
No. 104-1, § 102(c), p. 2 (1995)).
34. Id. at 2245.
35. Id. at 2249-50.
36. Id. Justice Alito contemplates two alternative cases that demonstrate the unusual
consequence of the majority's holding. Id. at 2243. In case one, a sex offender moves from
State A to State B following SORNA's enactment. Id. State A is well aware of the sex
offender's presence in that state following his release from prison. Id. However, State B
has no way of knowing of the sex offender's migration and may find it difficult to enforce
their own sex registration laws. Id. In case two, the sex offender travels from State A to
State B immediately prior to SORNA's enactment and again fails to register in State B. Id.
State B will certainly face the same difficulties in both cases. Id. However, under the
majority's holding, these two sex offenders will be treated differently. Id. Justice Alito
contends that "the Court offers no plausible explanation why Congress might have wanted
to treat this case any differently from the first." Id.
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tion laws.37 The Court's holding in Carr has left that chasm wide open.
However, even disregarding the anomalous policy implications of the
holding, the Court also misses the mark with their textual analysis. The
Court misapplies the Dictionary Act and incorrectly assumes that the first
act in a § 2250 offense is the registration requirement.
An analysis of SORNA that fully considers the statute's purpose and
policy implications will inevitably lead to an interpretation that includes
pre-SORNA travel within its scope. The dissent eloquently asserts that
"[w]hen an interpretation of a statutory text leads to a result that makes
no sense, a court should at a minimum go back and verify that the textual
analysis is correct."'38 To fully understand the anomaly of the majority's
holding, a brief examination of the legislative record is warranted. The
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act was included in Title I of
the Adam Walsh Act, which was enacted in response to "[t]he continued
vulnerability of America's children to sexual predators. '39 As the major-
ity alludes, Congress was concerned about the 100,000 unregistered sex
offenders whose locations were unknown to the public and law enforce-
ment.40 The legislation was intended to provide "enhanced registration
requirement[s]" and to "utilize the United States Marshals service in as-
sisting States to hunt down missing sex offenders. '41 Furthermore, the
legislation sought "to prevent more sexual predators from falling through
the cracks and molesting and harming and even murdering innocent vic-
tims."'42 The majority attempts to diminish the significance of the stat-
ute's purpose, which undoubtedly supports a broad construction of
SORNA, by suggesting that the government "confuses a general goal of
SORNA with the specific purpose of section 2250."'43 However, this ar-
gument is inherently flawed since the general goals of SORNA would
certainly encompass § 2250, the enforcement provision of the statute. As
a result, the majority's analysis grossly narrows the scope of SORNA, a
result that severely hampers the federal government's ability to track
down those 100,000 unregistered sex offenders the statute was supposed
to reach.44 While the majority intends to rely on state enforcement to
handle enforcement of sex registration laws, states' inability to locate
those individuals who traveled in interstate commerce was largely the
reason for the statute in the first place.45 Furthermore, SORNA provides
enhanced penalties over state law provisions, which would likely en-
courage those in hiding to register rather than face a ten-year prison sen-
37. Id. at 2238, 2240 n.9 (majority opinion).
38. Id. at 2249 (Alito, J., dissenting).




43. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2240.
44. See id. at 2249 (Alito, J., dissenting). See also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
45. See Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2238 (majority opinion) (recognizing the problem of using
"channels of interstate commerce in evading a State's reach").
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tence.46 By only applying the statute prospectively to post-SORNA
travel, those 100,000 "missing" sex offenders may never be found.
The Supreme Court also stumbles in their textual analysis of § 2250.
The Court relies on the Dictionary Act for their contention that "to
travel" should be read in the present tense.47 While the Court considers
the tense of other verbs in the statute, the Court elects to ignore the defi-
nitional section of the statute that refers to events occurring before
SORNA took effect.48 Furthermore, the Court compares the verbiage in
§ 2250 to the "undeviating use of the present tense" from the statute in
Gwaltney, a statute that explicitly confines its scope to future activity. 49
The unequivocal language from Gwaltney starkly contrasts the imprecise
language that Congress used in drafting SORNA. While attempting to
pick apart verb tenses in § 2250, the Court neglects an Attorney General
rule from the Code of Federal Regulations that suggests that pre-SORNA
travel would in fact be sufficient to satisfy § 2250's interstate travel re-
quirement.50 Additionally, the Court incorrectly assumes that the statute
reads as of the time that it becomes law. Legislative drafting principles
suggest that a statute should speak at the time it is read and thus should
"always" be written in the present tense.51 The majority's argument falls
apart once one considers these generally accepted rules of legislative
drafting. Lastly, the Court incorrectly presumes that the first act for con-
viction is the failure to register. In reality, the duty to register never
arises unless the defendant is convicted of the requisite sex offense.5 2
By engaging in a painstaking textual analysis of SORNA, the Supreme
Court "misses the forest for the trees." The Court reaches a decision that
is perverse to the intent of Congress and burdens the effective enforce-
ment of SORNA. SORNA was enacted to reach sex offenders like
Thomas Carr. The Court has left a gap in sex offender registration laws
that may never be filled.
46. See id. at 2239.
47. Id. at 2236.
48. See id. at 2237 n.6.
49. Id. at 2237 (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,
484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987)).
50. Id. at 2246 n.7 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007)).
51. Id. at 2244-45 (citing House Legislative Counsel's Manual on Drafting Style, HLC
No. 104-1, § 102(c), p. 2 (1995)).
52. See id. at 2246 n.4.
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